The interconnections between services and goods trade at the firm-Level by Ariu, Andrea et al.
ISSN 2042-2695 
CEP Discussion Paper No 1510 
November 2017 
The Interconnections between Services and Goods Trade 
at the Firm-Level 
Andrea Ariu 
Holger Breinlich 
Gregory Corcos 
Giordano Mion 
    
Abstract 
In this paper we study how international trade in goods and services interact at the firm level. Using a 
rich dataset on Belgian firms during the period 1995-2005, we show that: i) firms are much more 
likely to source services and goods inputs from the same origin country rather than from different 
ones; ii) increases in barriers to imports of goods reduce firm-level imports of services from the same 
market, and conversely. We build upon a discrete-choice model of goods and services input sourcing 
that can reproduce these facts to design our econometric strategy and use the estimated model for 
counterfactual analysis. In particular, we look at the quantitative impact of reductions in goods and 
services barriers between the US and the EU. Our findings have important implications for the design 
of trade policy. They suggest that a liberalization of service trade can have quite direct and sizable 
effects on goods trade and vice-versa, and that jointly liberalizing goods and services trade brings 
about substantial complementarities. 
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1 Introduction
Services feature prominently on the trade liberalization agenda. After the recent
Canada-EU Trade Agreement (CETA), the European Commission stated that “around
half of the overall GDP gains for the EU will come from liberalising trade in ser-
vices”.1 The recent Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) initiative between the US,
the EU and 21 trade partners aims to breathe new life into the Doha Round liberal-
ization talks. While the future of the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP) between the US and EU is highly uncertain in the current political
scenario, the proposal had services at the heart of its “Market Access” chapter. At the
same time a key element for the UK, the second largest services exporter in the world,
in the ongoing Brexit negotiations is precisely the future of trade in services with both
the EU and the rest of the world.
To date, the economic evaluation of services trade barriers has relied on sector-
specific studies (Francois and Hoekman, 2010), general equilibrium work with separate
goods and services sectors (Francois et al., 2003; Egger et al., 2012) or services-only
gravity models (Anderson et al., 2014). Yet, both anecdotal evidence and recent re-
search show increasingly blurred boundaries between the manufacturing and services
sectors. Production and trade statistics reveal significant services sales, exports and im-
ports by manufacturing firms.2 This may partly reflect a “servitization” process, i.e., a
shift from products to solutions and integrated “product-service systems” (Neely, 2008),
as well as a greater reliance of manufacturing firms on intermediate services, both do-
mestic and imported (Nord˚as, 2010; Timmer et al., 2013). These observations raise the
possibility that goods trade may directly and substantially benefit from services trade
liberalization, and vice-versa.
In this paper, we study if and how both types of trade interact at the level of in-
dividual firms. In particular, we study how firms’ imports of goods respond to the
liberalization of trade in services, and how firms’ imports of services react to goods
trade liberalization. We believe this question is important for at least two reasons.
First, simultaneous imports of goods and services is a first-order feature in our data
representing more than 80% of total imports value. Thus, existing firm-level research
focused on, for example, goods trade only completely overlooks an important services
trade component, and vice-versa. Secondly, estimating the interactions between the two
forms of trade is directly relevant for the design of trade policy and for the important
ongoing trade negotiations (TTIP, Brexit, etc.). Indeed, if there are complementarities
1See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/
2See Crozet and Milet (2017b), Breinlich and Criscuolo (2011), Ariu and Mion (2016), Walter and
Dell’mour (2010), Kelle and Kleinert (2010) among others.
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in sourcing goods and services from the same origin, lowering/increasing services bar-
riers might lead to higher/lower services and goods imports. This also suggests that
recent efforts to liberalize trade in services - where trade barriers are still significant
- might be highly effective at increasing goods trade in a context where tariff barriers
have already fallen to historically low levels.
To explore the interactions between goods and services trade and trade liberaliza-
tion at the firm level, we start by analyzing highly disaggregated data on Belgian firms’
imports between 1995 and 2005. Our descriptive exercise shows that firms are dispro-
portionately likely to import goods and services from the same rather than separate
origins. At the same time, reduced-form regressions suggest that, while controlling
for firm-year and country unobservables, a reduction in goods trade barriers from one
country has a positive effect on services imports from that same country.
To go beyond these reduced-form results, we build a model of good and service
input sourcing to guide our empirical analysis. The model features a final sector and
two (goods and services) intermediate sectors. Final producers may source intermediate
goods and services domestically or from abroad. To capture the observed sparsity of
imports across origin countries, intermediate sourcing is represented as a discrete choice
between pairs of country-specific goods and services varieties. The model fully specifies
the probability of sourcing inputs from countries, which increases in input quality and
decreases with trade costs, all else equal. Conditional on that choice, goods and services
import values are also specified as functions of a narrow set of parameters. The model
also allows for technological complementarities between inputs coming from the same
origin country.
We then use the model to design our estimation strategy. We use a two-stage
econometric approach where the first stage describes the choice of origin countries and
the second stage describes the value of imports of goods and services from chosen
country pairs. The theoretical model provides us with guidance on how to combine and
interpret parameters as well as on how to deal with selection bias in a consistent and
parsimonious way. More specifically, we end up using the selection model developed
in Lee (1983) and described by Bourguignon et al. (2007). The first-stage selection
equation features a conditional multinomial logit for the probability to source inputs
from a given country. In the second stage, we estimate two export value outcome
regressions, one for goods and one for services, that are augmented with selection-bias
controls coming from the first stage. We also allow for both firm-specific time-varying
and country-specific time invariant unobservables that may be arbitrarily correlated
with the regressors in both the first and second stage. Finally, we use our estimates to
perform counterfactual analysis.
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We examine the impact of three counterfactual policy experiments consisting in
reductions in goods and services trade barriers between the EU and the US. We find
large trade gains stemming from further integration that, under the current interna-
tional political scenario, might well be best considered as foregone gains from the lack
of further integration. In particular, we look at the “elimination” of goods tariffs and
services trade barriers between the EU and the US, first separately, then together. In
the case of services, we assume that counterfactual trade barriers between the US and
the EU are equivalent to those between countries having bilateral preferential trade
agreements including a services component, as reported by the WTO secretariat. Re-
sults reveal substantial gains from liberalizing trade with the US. A joint good-service
liberalization would boost Belgian imports from the US by 22% for goods and 11% for
services. Assuming the same increase for the whole Europe would imply an increase in
imports of, respectively, 60 and 24 billion dollars. An important element in our results
is that the gains from liberalizing both goods and services together are higher than the
sum of liberalizing goods and services separately. This unveils strong complementari-
ties between goods and services trade amplifying, for better or for worse, the impact of
changes in trade barriers; something that we believe deserves more attention in current
trade negotiations.
In addition to the literature on the quantification of services trade barriers mentioned
above, our work contributes to a small number of papers studying the connections
between services and goods trade and production at the level of individual firms. This
literature has been mostly descriptive in nature, highlighting the importance of firms
trading in, or producing, both goods and services (e.g., Crozet and Milet (2017b);
Ariu (2016b)). Three recent exceptions are Breinlich et al. (2016), Crozet and Milet
(2017a) and Ariu et al. (2016). Breinlich et al. (2016) analyze the impact of goods trade
liberalization on the shift of UK manufacturing firms into services, but do not look at
trade responses nor at the interaction between goods and services imports. Crozet and
Milet (2017a) studies the interaction between goods and services in the domestic market
finding that service sales have a positive impact on the performance of manufacturing
firms. This paper complements ours with a a domestic perspective on the good-service
relation but it does not investigate the related policy issues. Ariu et al. (2016) studies
why manufacturing exporters associate services to their goods exports and it provides
a micro-foundation of the different mechanisms that can explain the complementarity
between goods and services. While complementing our work on the exports as opposed
to the imports side, they do not look at trade policy scenarios.3 Finally, our work
3There is also a more substantial business literature on the shift of manufacturing firms into services
provision; see for example Roy et al. (2009) and Neely et al. (2011). These papers are descriptive in
nature and do not look at services trade.
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is related to recent quantitative models of firm-level imports, such as Kasahara and
Lapham (2013), Armenter and Koren (2013) and Antras et al. (2017). While these
papers also look at import sourcing choices at the firm level, they do not incorporate
services trade and its relation with goods trade.
This paper is organized in four additional sections. Section 2 presents the data and
two stylized facts paving the way to the theoretical model. Section 3 offers a model
generating predictions on goods and services intermediates imports at both the firm
and the aggregate levels. Section 4 is devoted to estimations. In Section 5 we present
counterfactual policy experiments. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data and Stylized Facts
In this section we outline the data used in the analysis and we provide some descriptive
evidence that will guide the construction of the theoretical framework.
2.1 Data
The empirical analysis of this paper needs four types of data: data on trade in services,
data on trade in goods as well as service and goods trade barriers.
Trade Data. Information on goods imports comes from the National Bank of Bel-
gium (NBB). The data is organized at the firm-year-origin-product level and spans the
1995-2005 period. Firms are identified by their VAT number and goods are classified
using the CN 8-digit nomenclature. We consider only transactions giving rise to a
change in ownership and we get rid of transactions referring to movements of stocks,
replacement or repair of goods, processing of goods as well as returns and transactions
without compensation. In this way, we eliminate trade performed by non-resident firms,
accounting for the majority of re-exports. The requirement for observing a firm-level
flow is rather low: firms trading with EU countries had to declare their transactions
in a given year if their cumulative imports in the European Union were above 104,115
Euros the year before. This threshold increased to 250,000 Euros between 1998 and
2005. Instead, firms trading with extra-EU countries had to declare to the NBB any
transaction exceeding 1,000 Euros and this limit remained stable over the 1995-2005
period.4 Similar thresholds apply to the French data used in Eaton et al. (2011), Mayer
and Ottaviano (2007) and Mayer et al. (2014).
4For more details on this dataset see Amiti et al. (2014), Ariu (2016b), Bernard et al. (2010) and
Muuˆls and Pisu (2009).
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Data on service imports were collected by the NBB during the period 1995-2005 to
compile the Balance of Payments. In particular, a list of firms had to directly declare to
the NBB any service transaction with a foreign firm above 12,500 Euros (9,000 Euros
from 1995 to 2001). For the other firms, the bank involved in the service transaction
was obliged (under the same threshold requirements) to record the information and
send it to the NBB.5 The data is organized at the firm-year-origin-product level. Firms
are identified using their VAT number and the service product classification follows
the usual Balance of Payments codes counting about 39 types of service products.6
We do not consider transactions classified as “Merchanting” and “Services between
Related Enterprises”. We exclude the first category because it combines the value
of merchanting services and the value of the goods involved. We exclude the second
because it doesn’t provide information on the specific service product traded. The data
comprises transactions under modes one, two and four of trade in services as defined
by the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), but there is no information
on the specific mode used in each transaction.7
We match the datasets on trade in goods and services by means of the unique
VAT firm identifier. As will become clear in the following, our estimation procedure is
computationally intensive, forcing us to reduce the dimensionality of our data in three
ways. First, we focus on the top 50 origin countries in terms of total Belgian imports
(goods and services) over the 1995-2005 period. Such countries represent 97.2% of total
Belgian imports over the period of analysis and are listed in Table A-2 in the Appendix.
We further restrict the analysis to those firms who have imported both goods and
services at least once during the period 1995-2005, though not necessarily from the
same country or in the same year. Apart from computational considerations, this last
restriction is applied because our objective is to study interconnections between goods
and services imports at the firm level. In order to construct firm-specific measures
of trade barriers (see below), we also need at least one import flow for both goods
and services. This second restriction means that we cannot make predictions of the
counterfactual behavior of firms outside our sample, such as non-importers turning into
importers. However, we can account for counterfactual scenarios in which, for example,
firms re-start importing services, or start importing from other origin countries. Overall,
5After 2005 the information on trade in services was collected using different surveys targeting
different types of services and firms. This major change undermines any possibility to extend the
analysis to more recent years. For more details about the change in the collection system refer to Ariu
(2016a).
6See Table 1 in Ariu (2016b) for a complete list.
7The logic of our model can be extended to mode 3 exports with appropriately defined variable
trade costs. However we choose to exclude these transactions from the analysis due to coverage and
quality issues with affiliate sales (FATS) data.
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firms in our sample accounted for 83.4% (84.4%) of Belgian imports of goods (services)
from the selected 50 countries in 2005.
In order to gain insights about what goods and services are imported jointly Tables 1
and 2 break down goods and services imports by product category among all importers
(A), the sample used in the estimation (ES) and the sub-sample of firms with joint im-
ports of goods and services from the same origin country and year (Strict Joint imports:
SJ). Sample SJ represents 43.42% (49.43%) of the value of goods (services) imports in
the ES sample. Column 2 of Table 1 reveals that the most common imported products
are Machinery, Vehicles, Mineral Products, and Chemicals. Columns 3 and 4 show
similar product breakdowns in sample ES and (to a lesser extent) SJ, suggesting that
joint goods-services imports affect most product categories. Columns 5 and 6 indicate
that joint sourcing is more likely in some categories though, namely Mineral Products,
Chemicals and Vehicles. Similarly, Table 2 reveals that Transportation, Travel and
Other business services represent the main services imported, but only the latter are
likely to be imported jointly with goods, as are IT, Communication and Construction
services. Overall, the same products tend to be imported jointly in samples ES and SJ
and the joint sourcing phenomenon is not driven by transportation or travel services.
Table 1: Breakdown of Belgian goods imports by products.
Section Share of imports Share of imports Share of imports Ratio 1 Ratio 2
(A) (ES) (SJ) (ES/A) (SJ/A)
LIVE ANIMALS; ANIMAL PRODUCTS 2.81% 2.50% 2.02% 0.8927 0.7185
VEGETABLE PRODUCTS 3.06% 2.82% 1.81% 0.9225 0.5909
ANIMAL OR VEGETABLE FATS AND OILS AND 0.57% 0.62% 0.50% 1.0828 0.8728
PREPARED FOODSTUFFS; BEVERAGES 4.53% 4.29% 3.46% 0.9459 0.7633
MINERAL PRODUCTS 10.83% 12.33% 20.82% 1.1384 1.9214
PRODUCTS OF THE CHEMICAL OR ALLIED 10.98% 11.64% 14.65% 1.0599 1.3342
PLASTICS AND ARTICLES THEREOF; RUBBER 6.05% 5.61% 5.42% 0.9280 0.8958
RAW HIDES AND SKINS 0.43% 0.33% 0.17% 0.7637 0.3857
WOOD AND ARTICLES OF WOOD; WOOD 1.08% 0.74% 0.54% 0.6847 0.4989
PULP OF WOOD OR OF OTHER FIBROUS 3.01% 2.82% 2.41% 0.9375 0.7998
TEXTILES AND TEXTILE ARTICLES 4.85% 3.81% 2.65% 0.7853 0.5449
FOOTWEAR 0.62% 0.42% 0.13% 0.6756 0.2062
ARTICLES OF STONE 1.40% 1.18% 0.98% 0.8473 0.7056
NATURAL OR CULTURED PEARLS 7.16% 8.00% 2.53% 1.1176 0.3542
BASE METALS AND ARTICLES OF BASE METAL 7.46% 7.26% 7.60% 0.9737 1.0184
MACHINERY AND MECHANICAL APPLIANCES; 18.16% 18.26% 17.09% 1.0056 0.9410
VEHICLES 11.78% 12.83% 14.00% 1.0893 1.1892
OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS 1.98% 1.90% 1.46% 0.9571 0.7349
ARMS AND AMMUNITION; PARTS AND 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.9683 1.0414
MISCELLANEOUS MANUFACTURED ARTICLES 2.45% 1.77% 0.83% 0.7226 0.3399
WORKS OF ART 0.74% 0.81% 0.90% 1.0931 1.2065
Note: product shares are computed for the 1995-2005 imports of all Belgian firms (A), firms in our estimation sample (ES) and firms importing goods and
services from the same country in the same year (Strictly Joint imports or SJ).
Finally, we drop the product dimension and work with aggregate goods and services
imports at the firm-destination level to make our empirical analysis computationally
feasible. Thus, for each firm-origin country-year combination, we observe total goods
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Table 2: Breakdown of Belgian services imports by product.
Section Share of imports Share of imports Share of imports Ratio 1 Ratio 2
(A) (ES) (SJ) (ES/A) (SJ/A)
Transportation 31.81% 29.69% 22.59% 0.9333 0.7101
Travel 20.56% 21.26% 15.05% 1.0338 0.7317
Communications services 4.03% 4.46% 6.28% 1.1076 1.5592
Construction services 3.08% 3.10% 4.51% 1.0081 1.4669
Insurance services 1.98% 1.41% 0.34% 0.7092 0.1696
Financial services 4.65% 4.65% 4.55% 1.0006 0.9798
Computer and information services 5.29% 5.71% 7.63% 1.0793 1.4407
Royalties and license fees 4.26% 4.64% 7.54% 1.0896 1.7705
Other business services 21.43% 22.09% 28.28% 1.0313 1.3201
Personal, cultural, and recreational services 1.48% 1.43% 1.40% 0.9618 0.9454
Government services, n.i.e. 1.43% 1.56% 1.84% 1.0894 1.2798
Note: product shares are computed for the 1995-2005 imports of all Belgian firms (A), firms in our estimation sample (ES) and firms importing goods and services
from the same country in the same year (Strictly Joint imports or SJ).
and total services imports. We will, however, use the product dimension in the con-
struction of our trade barrier measures below. This choice relieves us from solving the
issue that the level of aggregation for goods and services are very different (e.g. 39
service types against about 10,000 products). Moreover, it is not a relevant issue since,
if we look at I-O tables for Belgium, we observe that every sector imports both goods
and services from all sectors. More specifically, out of the 34*34 input-output relations
(looking only at imports), only 1.6% have zero values.
Trade Barriers Data Turning to trade barriers data, we use data on ad valorem
applied goods import tariffs coming from the online customs tariff database (TARIC)
provided by the European Commission. This dataset combines most-favored nation and
preferential tariff-like restrictions applying to goods entering the EU market by country
of origin and CN8 product code for several years. This level of detail is a unique feature
of these data compared to, for example, the widely used UNCTAD’s TRAINS database
in which only information at the HS6 digit is available.8 The data is organized at the
country of origin-product level and is available for the entire 1995-2005 period. We
denote by tGpgt the % tariff on good product p imported from country g at time t.
9
Our measure of services trade restrictions are based on the OECD Product Market
Regulation (PMR) index. More precisely, we use PMR data on the Accounting, Legal,
Architectural, Engineering, Telecom, Post, and Air, Rail and Road Transport sectors,
8See Mion and Zhu (2013) for further details.
9In a relative small amount of cases the information on tariffs is missing. In such cases we record
tariffs as zero and assign value one to a dummy, that we use alongside the tariffs data, to construct an
additional control. More specifically we construct, building on the formula of firm-specific weighted
import barriers for goods described below, a measure of the share of imports of goods value of firm k
from country g at time t for which we have no information on the goods trade cost tGpgt. Such additional
control is used throughout our estimations.
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which we map into our Balance of Payments categories using the correspondence pro-
vided in Table A-1 in the Appendix.10 The main advantage of using PMR data is that
they cover service sector restrictions over time and for multiple sectors. Alternative
datasets such as the World Bank SRI or the OECD STRI include more countries and
finer service categories coverage, but they are available only for one year, making them
unsuitable for our analysis. While the OECD PMR mainly targets domestic regulation
which is de jure non-discriminatory (i.e. the restrictions are applied by Belgium to
all firms regardless of the origin country), it represents de facto a serious obstacle to
cross-border trade (Crozet et al., 2016). This is because domestic regulation is usually
designed with domestic suppliers in mind. This makes it harder for foreign service
suppliers to serve the market as they have, of course, also to comply with the same
regulations (which is possibly different from the one of the origin country). In addition,
the PMR index has a “barriers to trade and investment” component which captures dis-
criminatory regulations. Other papers (e.g. Crozet et al. (2016)) have used the OECD
PMR index as a measure of service trade barriers for the same reasons. Now, while
the PMR index varies across sectors and over time, it does not vary across the origin
countries from which Belgium imports. To allow for variation along this dimension, we
interact the PMR index with data from the WTO Regional Trade Agreement dataset,
which indicates whether a country has a trade agreement covering trade in services with
another country.11 Therefore our measure of services trade barriers combines the PMR
index and the WTO data in the following way:
tSpst = PMRpt ×RTAst
where PMRpt denotes the PMR index for the service product p at time t corre-
sponding to Belgium and RTAst takes value one in the absence of a RTA between
Belgium and country s covering trade in services at time t, and zero otherwise.
The interaction between PMRpt and RTAst broadly captures the differential obsta-
10Since the data for the Accounting, Legal, Architectural, Engineering sectors are available only for
1998, 2003 and 2008, we impose a linear interpolation for the missing years in order to cover the entire
period of our analysis. For the few Balance of Payments categories for which there is no data on PMR
we recoded them as zero and assign value one to a dummy, that we use alongside the PMR index, to
construct an additional control. More specifically we construct, building on the formula of firm-specific
weighted import barriers for services described below, a measure of the share of imports of services
value of firm k from country s at time t for which we have no information on the service trade cost
tSpst. Such additional control is used throughout our estimations.
11Available at http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx These data are based on the
compulsory notification of the establishment of a Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) to the WTO by
the parties concerned with indication of the content and scope of the agreement. Therefore, we are able
to track the countries involved in the agreement, the date of the agreement and whether it includes
services, goods or both.
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cles faced by a firm exporting service p to Belgium depending on whether the country
of the firm has in place a service trade agreement with Belgium or not. A firm coming
from a country that has no services trade agreement with Belgium is deemed to face
higher de facto or de jure discriminatory restrictions to services trade.
Equipped with measures of goods and services trade barriers tGpgt and t
S
pst, we are in
a position to construct firm-specific weighted import barriers as follows:12
tGgkt =
∑
p
ϕkpt
G
pgt where ϕkp =
∑
t
∑
g Imp
goods
pgkt∑
p
∑
t
∑
g Imp
goods
pgkt
tSskt =
∑
p
φkpt
S
pst where φkp =
∑
t
∑
s Imp
services
pskt∑
p
∑
t
∑
s Imp
services
pskt
where p indicates the good or service product, k the firm, g (s) the origin country of
goods (services), t the year and Impgoodspgkt (Imp
services
pskt ) corresponds to imports of goods
(services). Constructing firm-specific trade barriers in this way allows us to exploit the
product dimension of our data to some extent, even though we cannot use it for the
main analysis due to computational constraints. Notice also that the weights are time-
and origin-invariant and measure the importance of a given imported good or service
for the firm. The idea behind this approach is to capture the set of trade barriers that
are relevant to firm k, rather than using cruder proxies such as industry affiliation. For
example, if firm k has ever imported good g, this means that g is likely to be of value to
firm k (possibly because it is a production input). So, firm k will be affected by higher
trade barriers on good g, irrespective of whether it is currently importing it or not.13
Using time-origin-invariant weights also avoids spurious correlations between import
flows and our trade barrier measures. Last but not least, in unreported results we have
also experimented using firm-product weights based on 1995-2000 import patterns while
estimating the model only for the time frame 2001-2005. Results are qualitatively, and
to a large extent also quantitatively, identical but we lose in precision.
The basic combined dataset of imports values and imports barriers for goods (ser-
vices) at the firm-origin-year level comprises 1,239,294 (1,041,486) observations. Mean,
median and standard deviation of imports values (million euros) and import barriers
are provided in Table 3.
12Our firm-level weights give more importance to those products that have a higher share in the
total imports of the firm. In order to check to what extent our results rely upon this choice, we have
experimented with assigning equal weights and ultimately found very similar results.
13An alternative approach would be to use domestic input usage to construct our weights. Unfortu-
nately, such information is not available to us and explains why we need to focus on firms that have
imported goods and services at least once.
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Table 3: Some Sample Descriptives
Obs Mean Median St. Dev.
Goods Imports Impgoodsgkt 1,239,294 5.012 0.098 70.214
Services Imports Impservicesskt 1,041,486 1.376 0.080 15.962
Goods Tariffs tGgkt 1,239,294 0.626 0.000 1.966
Services Trade Barriers tSskt 1,041,486 0.512 0.000 1.038
2.2 Key Features of the Data
In this section, we outline two features of the data that will guide the construction of
our theoretical model.
As documented in numerous studies, firm-level imports are sparsely distributed
across countries and years. In our sample positive goods imports are observed in 11.7%
of the all the possible firm-country-year triples and services imports only 5.6% of the
time. Therefore, there is a high number of zeros in the data. While import flows of
either type are sparse, a key feature of the combined data is that imports of goods and
services from the same country are extremely frequent. To give an idea, consider the
count of firm-year pairs with positive imports of goods from g and services from s. The
frequency of joint imports (g = s) is five times higher than the product of the marginal
frequencies for all countries.
Fact 1: The probability of observing a joint service-good flow is low but higher than
the product of the probabilities of observing them separately.
This raw statistic suggests the existence of a strong complementarity between goods
and services imports from the same country. Note that such complementarity cannot be
explained by simple comparative advantage and/or trade cost patterns arguments. For
example, if the US has a comparative advantage in computers (goods) and computer
services (services), both the probability of joint imports from the US and the product of
the marginal probabilities will be high and should be roughly comparable. In Section
3 we will model this complementarity as coming from a productivity channel where
final good output is higher whenever intermediates are sources from the same country.
For example, the productivity of US computers might be enhanced by the use of US
computer services; something that would arise if the US firm selling the computer tailors
the services to the good or even use the services to make the goods more relationship-
specific, as in the case of maintenance, leasing or ‘business solutions’. Section 3 discusses
this mechanism in more detail including an analysis based on input-output tables and
also looks at related mechanisms that could generate Fact 1.
11
When moving to estimation in Section 4 we then allow for the presence of a rather
different channel that can indeed generate Fact 1, namely fixed costs. As long as
there are fixed costs involved in importing something from one country, and fixed costs
for importing goods and services from the same country are less than the sum of the
fixed costs of importing only goods or only services, there would be scope for fixed
costs savings from joint imports of goods and services from the same country that can
generate Fact 1. Yet those fixed costs should affect the likelihood of joint imports
but not import values conditional on importing. In our estimations we find that both
the likelihood of importing and import values are higher when goods and services are
sourced from the same country which is consistent with our story.
Our second fact highlights another form of interdependency between goods and
services sourcing decisions, namely that goods trade barriers reduce the likelihood of
importing services from the same country, and the other way around. To show this,
we separately model the choice of importing goods and the choice of importing services
from a given origin country by firm k at time t. For each firm-year pair in the data for
which we observe imports from at least one origin, we construct the dummy IGgkt taking
value one if firm k imports goods from country g at time t and zero otherwise (i.e., if the
firm imports from two out of fifty possible origins, IGgkt = 1 for two firm-destination-year
observation and zero for the remaining 48). ISgkt = 1 is defined accordingly. We model
the sourcing decision as depending on both goods and services trade barriers as well as
firm-time fixed effects and country dummies:
IGgkt = dg + dkt + β
S
1 t
S
gkt + β
G
1 t
G
gkt + η
G
gkt (1)
ISskt = ds + dkt + β
S
2 t
S
skt + β
G
2 t
G
skt + η
S
skt (2)
where, for example, tSgkt is the service import barrier of firm k at time t corresponding
to country g, i.e., the same country for which we consider the goods import barrier
(s=g). Country dummies dg and ds control for gravity determinants of trade flows
while firm-year fixed effects dkt control for unobserved idiosyncratic shocks that may
affect the import decision. We estimate a conditional logit model and cluster standard
errors at the firm-year level.14 Results are reported in Table 4 while in Table A-3 in the
Appendix we report results obtained excluding Vehicles from goods and Transportation
14It would have been perhaps desirable to cluster standard errors at the country level. However, this
is technically not possible when having fixed effects dkt in the regression. Indeed, in order to operate
clustering of standard errors in fixed effects models individuals (a firm-time pair in our setting) should
be nested within clusters while in our regression the same firm-year could span into several clusters
(countries).
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from services (two clear candidates for global value chains trade) from the regression.
Table 4: Reduced-form estimates of the impact of services trade barriers on goods
sourcing choices, and vice versa
Goods Services
(1) (2)
Dep. Var.: IGgkt = 1 I
S
skt = 1
Goods trade barriers -0.0480a -0.0183a
(0.0026) (0.0029)
Services trade barriers -0.0061 -0.0618a
(0.0044) (0.0069)
Firm-Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 5,209,100 3,123,400
Pseudo R-squared 0.3999 0.3981
Number of firm-years 104,182 62,468
Note: Firm-time clustered standard errors in parentheses. a p<0.01,
b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Both types of trade barriers have a negative effect on both types of trade. The
probability to import services from a given origin country is negatively and significantly
correlated with both goods and service trade barriers. At the same time, the probability
to import goods is negatively and significantly correlated with goods trade barriers.
In the same regression the coefficient of service trade barriers is negative but fails
(not by much) to be significant. Furthermore, the correlation between tGgkt and t
S
skt is
equal to 0.339 which is positive as expected but not large enough to generate multi-
collinearity and prevent identification. Interpreting coefficients in Table 4 is difficult
because the conditional logit model does not allow recovering meaningful marginal
effects. Yet, if we run the same two estimations with a linear probability model, where
actually all coefficients are negative and highly significant, we get the following insights.
Considering the first regression, the expectation of IGgkt in the data, i.e., the probability
that IGgkt = 1, is 0.1166. The coefficients of goods and services trade barriers are such
that a 1 standard deviation increase of such barriers would reduce the probability of
importing goods from a given country by 0.0060 (goods barriers) and 0.0069 (services
barriers) probability units, i.e., roughly 5% and 6% of the unconditional probability.
Moving to the second regression, a 1 standard deviation increase in barriers would
reduce the probability of importing services from a given country by 0.0007 (goods
13
barriers) and 0.0041 (services barriers) probability units, i.e., roughly 1% and 7% of the
unconditional probability.
Fact 2: Controlling for both firm-year and country unobservables, goods trade bar-
riers are negatively correlated with service imports and vice-versa.
3 Theory
In what follows we present a simple sourcing model that will be used to guide our
empirical analysis. The model is simple in many respects and we will subsequently
relax some of its assumptions in order to cope with the richness of the actual data. This
means our framework does not correspond to a structural approach. Yet, the theoretical
model is useful in that it provides guidance on how to combine and interpret parameters
as well as on how to deal with selection bias in a consistent and parsimonious way.
There are C countries with identical preferences and market structure. Most of the
exposition will focus on a single importing country, for the sake of saving notation and
matching our empirical application. In each country there are L consumers endowed
with one unit of labor each. We assume that the preferences of the representative
consumer are represented by:
U(A,M) = A1−βMβ (3)
whereA denotes consumption of the non-tradable numeraire goodA andM =
(∫ N
0
q
σ−1
σ
k dk
) σ
σ−1
denotes consumption of a CES aggregate final product (see below).
National income equals labor income and profits. It is assumed that each worker has
an equal share in a perfectly diversified international portfolio. It follows that national
income is given by:
Y = L+ L
Πw
Lw
(4)
where Πw denotes world profits, which will be determined endogenously below, and Lw
denotes world population.
3.1 Final sector
A sector. Good A is produced out of labor under the following linear technology:
A = F (LA) = LA (5)
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where LA denotes labor use by sector A. We assume that A is costlessly tradable and
that all countries produce that good, so that wages equal one everywhere.15
M sector: demand. In industry M final goods are also nontradable and sold on a
monopolistically competitive domestic market. Demand for variety k of the final good
equals:
qk = βY
p−σk
P 1−σ
(6)
where Pd ≡
(∫ N
0
p1−σk dk
) 1
1−σ
and N is the mass of varieties consumed in the country.
M sector: supply. Each final good producer k uses two types of inputs: goods (G)
and services (S). Goods and services are differentiated by origin country, and each
country produces a single variety g and a single variety s (an Armington assumption).
We further assume that final producers can only choose one good g and one service
s.16 This reduces input choice to the discrete choice of where to source each of the two
inputs from. For each firm the index g will refer to both a good and an origin country,
and similarly for s. Goods and services are combined to produce output qk using a
Cobb-Douglas technology:17
∀k, qk(qgk, qsk) = Θgsξgskλgλsϕkqαgkq1−αsk (7)
where qgk and qsk represent quantities of intermediate good g and service s and
0 < α < 1. λg > 1 and λs > 1 capture the quality of inputs g and s. Θgs is a parameter
that takes value Θ ≥ 1 if both inputs are sourced from the same country, and value 1
otherwise.18 ϕk is an idiosyncratic TFP parameter while ξgsk is a random variable whose
15Sector A may be thought of as agriculture. Having constant wages simplifies the analysis of import
choices considerably. In the empirical part of this paper we will control for cross-country differences
in wages with country fixed effects. Also, the counterfactual analysis will be restricted to non-drastic
trade policy changes, which makes it easier to overlook trade-driven wage changes.
16In the data we observe firms importing goods and services from multiple countries. In the model
we assume that firms choose only one g and one s, in order to obtain simple expressions that will be
useful in handling the size of the dataset used in the estimation. To give an idea of the problem, we
are going to use 10 years of data and 50 origin countries implying that for each firm in the data we
will have 50 × 50 × 10 = 25, 000 corresponding observations. This assumption will be relaxed in the
empirical analysis.
17The model could easily accommodate the more general case of a CES production function, with
an elasticity of substitution either above or below the benchmark value of one. However, when turning
to estimation some key parameters would not be identified due to non-linearities. Indeed random
utility models, like the one we will spell out below, cannot handle non-linearity in parameters. The
production function could also have labor as an additional factor, though the unit wages assumption
makes the omission innocuous. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
18This assumption, which is motivated by Fact 1, is discussed at length in Section 3.4.
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properties are explained below. Minimization of the costs of producing qk implies:
qgk =
1
Θgsξgskλgλsϕk
(
αps
(1− α)pg
)1−α
qk (8)
qsk =
1
Θgsξgskλgλsϕk
(
(1− α)pg
αps
)α
qk (9)
so that marginal cost does not depend on scale and equals
ck =
Γpαg p
1−α
s
Θgsξgskλgλsϕk
where Γ = α−α(1− α)α−1 is a constant.
Given (pg, ps, λg, λs,Θgs, ξgsk, ϕk) and the price index P , producer k solves
max
{pk}
{(pk −
Γpαg p
1−α
s
Θgsξgskλgλsϕk
)
(
βY
p−σk
P 1−σ
)
} (10)
which implies the following optimal price
pk =
σ
σ − 1
Γpαg p
1−α
s
Θgsξgskλgλsϕk
(11)
Final production sold in k equals
qk = βY
(
σ − 1
σ
Θgsξgskλgλsϕk
Γpαg p
1−α
s
)σ
P σ−1 (12)
so that firm k’s profits equal
pik =
1
σ
βY
(
σ − 1
σ
Θgsξgskλgλsϕk
Γpαg p
1−α
s
)σ−1
P σ−1 (13)
and log profits are given by
lnpik = ln
(
1
σ
βY (
σ − 1
σ
P )σ−1
)
+(σ−1) ln Θgs+(σ−1) ln
(
λgλs
Γpαg p
1−α
s
)
+(σ−1) lnϕk+(σ−1) ln ξgsk
(14)
We now turn to the choice of g and s by final producers.
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3.2 Intermediate goods and services sector
Choice of supplier We assume that suppliers price at marginal cost, inclusive of
iceberg trade costs.19 We also assume goods and service inputs bear iceberg trade costs
τg ≥ 1 and τs ≥ 1 with τg = 1 (τs = 1) if the good (service) is sourced domestically.
We assume that one unit of intermediate goods (services) is produced out of cg (cs)
units of labor. Marginal cost pricing implies
pg = τgcg (15)
ps = τscs. (16)
Each pair of good g and service s is characterized by a random productivity com-
ponent ln ξgsk which is known and idiosyncratic to the buyer firm. For each gs pair,
we treat ln ξgsk as a set of iid random variables following a Gumbel distribution with
cumulative distribution function
F (x) = exp
[
− exp[−(x
µ
+ γ)]
]
and density
f(x) ≡ dF (x)
dx
=
1
µ
exp[−(x
µ
+ γ)] exp
[
− exp[−(x
µ
+ γ)]
]
where µ > 0 and γ is the Euler constant. Our assumptions imply that firm k’s draw
of ln ξgsk for a given gs pair is independent of draws for other gs pairs as well as other
firms’ draws.
Each purchase of a good-service combination therefore represents an independent
choice between the C2 alternative combinations of goods and services. Given (14),
producer k chooses a sourcing country g for goods and s for services to maximize (a
monotonic transformation of):
ln Θgs + ln
(
λgλs
(τgcg)α(τscs)1−α
)
+ lnϕk + ln ξgsk.
This can be interpreted as a multinomial logit linear random utility model20 where
19This follows from the Armington assumption and ensures tractability. The setup could be extended
to exogenous country-specific markups, but more sophisticated pricing strategies would prevent us from
finding a closed-form solution for country pairs’ markets shares.
20See Anderson et al. (1992) for a textbook treatment.
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the individual (firm k) maximizes utility U˜gsk = ugsk + ln ξgsk where
ugsk = ln Θgs + lnλg + lnλs − α ln(τgcg)− (1− α) ln(τscs) + lnϕk
Given distributional assumptions on ln ξgsk, the probability that firm k chooses a
particular good-service combination gs is given by:
sgsk =
(ϕk)
1
µ ( Θgsλgλs
(τgcg)α(τscs)1−α )
1
µ
(ϕk)
1
µ
∑
gs
(
( Θgsλgλs
(τgcg)α(τscs)1−α )
1
µ
) = ( Θgsλgλs(τgcg)α(τscs)1−α ) 1µ∑
gs
(
( Θgsλgλs
(τgcg)α(τscs)1−α )
1
µ
) ≡ sgs (17)
Notice that the idiosyncratic TFP parameter ϕk cancels out.
Conditional input demand Given (8), (12), (15) and (16), producer k’s demand
for intermediate good g conditional on choosing gs equals
qgk =
1
Θgsξgskλgλsϕk
(
αps
(1− α)pg
)1−α
βY
(
σ − 1
σ
Θgsξgskλgλsϕk
Γpαg p
1−α
s
)σ
P σ−1
= (Θgsξgskλgλsϕk)
σ−1 (τscs)
(1−σ)(1−α) (τgcg)
α−1−ασ
(
α
(1− α)
)1−α(
σ − 1
σ
1
Γ
)σ
β︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
Y P σ−1
(18)
The value of purchased intermediate goods is thus:
pgqgk = (Θgsξgskλgλsϕk)
σ−1 (τscs)
(1−σ)(1−α) (τgcg)
α(1−σ) BY P σ−1 (19)
Similarly, producer k’s demand for intermediate services s equals:
qsk =
1
Θgsξgskλgλsϕk
(
(1− α)pg
αps
)α
βY
(
σ − 1
σ
Θgsξgskλgλsϕk
Γpαg p
1−α
s
)σ
P σ−1
= (Θgsξgskλgλsϕk)
σ−1 (τscs)
(1−σ)(1−α)−1 (τgcg)
α(1−σ)
(
α
(1− α)
)−α(
σ − 1
σ
1
Γ
)σ
β︸ ︷︷ ︸
B′
Y P σ−1
(20)
and the value of purchased intermediate services equals:
psqsk = (Θgsξgskλgλsϕk)
σ−1 (τscs)
(1−σ)(1−α) (τgcg)
α(1−σ) B′σ−1 (21)
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Notice in (19) and (21) that an increase in goods iceberg trade costs reduces imports
of services, and vice-versa. This holds irrespective of whether the sourcing country is
the same for goods and services (g = s). Also note this result holds in our Cobb-Douglas
specification in which goods and services are neither complements not substitutes.
3.3 Closing the model
Aggregate Profits and National Income We now index importing countries by
subscript d. Given marginal cost pricing in the intermediate sector only final sector
firms earn profits. Aggregate world profits enter national income as seen in (4). We
further assume that Nd is exogenous as in Chaney (2008).
World profits are equal to:
Πw =
∑
d
∫ Nd
0
pidkdk =
∑
d
∫ Nd
0
βYd
σ
(
σ
σ − 1cdk
)1−σ
P σ−1d dk
=
∑
d
βYd
σ
P σ−1d
∫ Nd
0
p1−σdk dk
=
∑
d
βYd
σ
=
βYw
σ
where Yw =
∑
d Yd.
Since
Yw = Lw + Πw = Lw +
βYw
σ
=
σ
σ − βLw
it follows that
Πw =
β
σ − βLw
and
Yd =
σ
σ − βLd (22)
Price Index Recall that P ≡
(∫ N
0
p1−σk dk
) 1
1−σ
, where pk =
σ
σ−1
Γcαg τ
α
g c
1−α
s τ
1−α
s
Θgsξgskλgλsϕk
. From
equation 2.25 in Anderson et al. (1992) we know that the probability of choosing a
particular country pair gs, i.e., the probability that U˜gsk is maximal across country
pairs, can be written as:
sgs =
∫ ∞
−∞
f(x)
∏
qr 6=gs
F (ugsk − uqrk + x)dx,
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where F (.) refers to the Gumbel cumulative distribution function and f(.) its density.
The term inside the integral represents the probability density of ln ξgsk being equal
to x and x being such that gs is chosen. Recalling that all firms draw from the same
Gumbel distributions irrespective of their ϕk we can write:
P =
(∑
gs
(
σ
σ − 1
Γcαg τ
α
g c
1−α
s τ
1−α
s
Θgsλgλs
)1−σ
E
[
ϕσ−1k
] ∫ ∞
−∞
ex
σ−1
f(x)
∏
qr 6=gs
F (ugsk − uqrk + x)dx
) 1
1−σ
(23)
3.4 The importance of Θgs
The Θgs component in the production function (7) takes a higher value when inputs
come from the same country. We show below that this parameter implies a greater
probability of sourcing goods and services inputs from the same country, a key feature
of the data which we labelled Fact 1 in Section 2. At the same time, the presence of
Θgs implies that, everything else equal, also import values conditional on importing
should be higher when inputs come from the same country; something that is at odds
with an alternative, to our Θgs, channel potentially driving Fact 1: fixed costs savings
from jointly importing goods and services from the same country. In our estimations
in Section 4 we allow for both Θgs and fixed costs to affect importing behavior.
We acknowledge the parameter Θgs may well capture a number of related economic
mechanisms. Firstly, it may capture that there is an advantage if the same exporting
firm supplies both g and s.21 This is the case when: i) the good and/or the service are
of higher quality if bought from the same firm. For example, the presence of the service
can be perceived as higher quality of the products (Ariu et al., 2016). Similarly, some
intangibles owned by the supplier, such as ISO9000 quality certification or a reputation
for quality, have non-rival effects on g and s.22 At the same time, proprietary knowledge
can potentially make original component manufacturers the best providers of services
of those goods; the same firm can be better in tailoring services to the goods, or uses
the services to make the goods more relationship-specific. This is likely in the case of
maintenance, leasing or “business solutions” that outsource some of the downstream
firm’s tasks. ii) joint exports from the same firm are alike to arise when a parent firm
provides specific “headquarter” services along with intra-firm goods trade to an affiliate.
21Ariu et al. (2016) shows that about 10% of exporters offer both goods and services together,
accounting for more than 45% of trade.
22According to Bernard et al. (2010) this argument may explain the greater propensity of the most
productive Belgian firms to perform “carry-along trade”.
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iii) when transaction or search costs are high and/or there are economies of scope in
producing both.
Secondly, Θgs may capture country-specific complementarity in goods and services,
resulting for instance from service providers being more familiar with national goods.
In the case of engineering, design, consulting, maintenance or monitoring services, that
familiarity is likely to make goods and services of the same origin more complementary
than with varieties of other countries. While all these mechanisms are interesting, we
do not provide more specific microfoundations as the lack of data on the identity of
foreign exporters prevents us from discriminating between these stories.23 Yet, results
obtained from combining our data with Input-Output Tables for Belgium do provide
some interesting information. More specifically, goods and services products that are
jointly imported from the same country in the same year (SJ sample) are systematically
characterized by higher weights in the input-output technology of the importing firms
as compared to those goods and services products imported in the whole sample (ES
sample).24
Turning back to the model the Θgs assumption implies that the probability of choos-
ing a particular gs combination in our model is generally different from the product of
the marginal probabilities (of sourcing goods from g and services from s). Only in the
special case of Θgs = 1,∀g, s the joint probability equals the product of the marginal
probabilities.
To see this, consider the following. Given the problem each firm k is solving is
characterized by a finite number of alternatives we readily have:
max
gs
{U˜gsk} = max
g
{max
s
{U˜gsk}} (24)
Consider one possible origin country for goods imports, g∗, that may or may not be
chosen by firm k. Due to the IIA property of the multinomial logit, the probability of
sourcing services from country s rather than s∗ is the same conditionally on sourcing
goods from a particular country g∗ or not (see Anderson et al. (1992) p23, Equation
2.10). Therefore we can start solving problem (24) by choosing a country s among C
possible countries to source services from, so as to maximize:
23Ariu et al. (2016) provide evidence on the mechanisms behind goods-services complementarity.
24We assign each firm-year to its corresponding two-digit Nace rev 1.1 main industry affiliation
and use Input-Output Table weights for Belgium broken down at the two-digit Nace rev 1.1 level for
the year 2000. We then compute, separately for the SJ and ES samples, equivalent weights based
on imported goods and services products. We finally analyze the difference between imports-based
weights and input-output weights and find that in the SJ sample such difference is, as compared to the
ES sample, more likely to be positive for goods and services products with high input-output weights.
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Uˆ g
∗
sk = u
g∗
sk + ln ξ
g∗
sk
where ug
∗
sk = ln η
g∗ + ln Θg
∗
s + lnλs − (1− α) ln(τscs) + lnϕk (25)
where ηg
∗
=
λg∗
(τg∗cg∗ )α
is an irrelevant constant in this problem, Θg
∗
s =Θgs for g=g
∗ or
equivalently Θg
∗
s = Θg∗s, and ln ξ
g∗
sk = ln ξgsk for g=g
∗ is distributed Gumbel and is iid
across firms and alternatives.
This implies that a multinomial logit model can be used to describe this problem.
The probability of importing services from a country s conditional on g=g∗ is given by:
sg
∗
sk = s
g∗
s =
( Θ
g∗
s λs
(τscs)1−α )
1
µ∑
s
(
( Θ
g∗
s λs
(τscs)1−α )
1
µ
) . (26)
Note that in general sg
∗
s 6= sg
′
s because Θ
g∗
s 6= Θg
′
s . Conversely we can find the
optimal g given s is equal to a particular s∗. More precisely, for a given source country
of services there are equivalent expressions to (25) and (26) leading to:
ss
∗
gk = s
s∗
g =
(
Θs
∗
g λg
(τgcg)α
)
1
µ∑
g
(
(
Θs∗g λg
(τgcg)α
)
1
µ
) . (27)
Finally note the following. Suppose we set Θgs = 1,∀g, s. We will then have sg∗s =
sg
′
s = ss and s
s∗
g = s
s
′
g = sg with:
sgss =
( λg
(τgcg)α
)
1
µ∑
g
(
( λg
(τgcg)α
)
1
µ
) ( λs(τscs)1−α ) 1µ∑
s
(
( λs
(τscs)1−α )
1
µ
) = ( λgλs(τgcg)α(τscs)1−α ) 1µ∑
gs
(
( λgλs
(τgcg)α(τscs)1−α )
1
µ
) = sgs, (28)
which means that the choice of the sourcing country for goods and services are
independent.
4 Estimation
4.1 Econometric Model
The theoretical model delivers three fundamental equations to be estimated.
Firstly, each firm k is solving the following problem:
22
max
g,s
{U˜gsk} (29)
where U˜gsk = ugsk + ln ξgsk
ugsk = ln Θgs + lnλg + lnλs − α ln(τgcg)− (1− α) ln(τscs) + lnϕk
and ln ξgsk is iid across firms and gs pairs and is distributed Gumbel with shape pa-
rameter µ. Solving this problem yields the multinomial logit choice probabilities (17)
of choosing each potential gs country pair.
Secondly, the model predicts the value of imports of goods and services from any
potential gs country pair. However, we only observe imports from chosen country pairs.
In the model, conditional on choosing a particular gs, these are given by:
pgqgk = (Θgsξgskλgλsϕk)
σ−1 (τscs)
(1−σ)(1−α) (τgcg)
α(1−σ) BY P σ−1 (30)
psqsk = (Θgsξgskλgλsϕk)
σ−1 (τscs)
(1−σ)(1−α) (τgcg)
α(1−σ) B′σ−1. (31)
The model described by (29-31) has two outcome equations of interest, (30) and
(31), and a conditional multinomial logit selection equation (29). To estimate such a
model, we use a two-stage estimation method drawing from the theory developed in
Lee (1983), and described by Bourguignon et al. (2007).
Note that in the model a fall in some country’s (say g∗) goods tariff raises service
imports from other countries, not just from that country. This is because the (now
cheaper) good is complementary with services sourced from any origin, albeit more
complementary with services sourced from the same origin. The resulting change in
imports can be decomposed into two effects. The first is a change in the probabilities of
importing that favors all g∗s origins at the expense of the other gs combinations. The
second one comes from import values conditional on importing, that would increase for
all g∗s origins and remain constant for the other gs combinations.
In designing an empirical counterpart to (29-31) we extend the theoretical model in
four ways. First, we introduce a time dimension, t. Second, we allow for the presence
of fixed costs to start importing from a particular gs pair. Denote by ygskt a binary
variable that takes value one when a particular gs combination is chosen by firm k
in year t. Fixed costs make the choice of origin dependent on past choices, which we
capture by introducing the lagged dependent variable ygsk,t−2 in the first-stage selection
equation. Such fixed costs should not affect second-stage conditional import equations,
which we use as an exclusion restriction. Note that we let these fixed costs vary freely
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across country pairs, so that our assumption is consistent with fixed cost savings from
joint imports, as in for instance Antras et al. (2017). While fixed cost savings are
consistent with Fact 1, they cannot however explain systematic differences in import
values, which we find below.
Third, different firms import different goods and services, and we do observe the
specific products imported. In our analysis we do not fully exploit the product dimen-
sion, mainly to reduce the dimensionality of the problem. For example by collapsing the
product dimension we will still be working with about 300 million observations when
estimating the counterpart to (29) while including a large number of dummy variables.
We do however exploit some of the information coming from the product dimension by
allowing trade costs to vary by firm, country and year: τgkt and τskt. More specifically,
we exploit the heterogeneity across firms in the trade costs of the specific inputs they
import as an additional source of identification and use the proxies outlined in Section
2.
Fourth, we allow for multiple-origin importers, i.e., firms that import from many
origins in the same year. In our sample roughly 40% (60%) of firms import goods
(services) from a single origin country in a given year, behaving exactly as in our
model. We choose to include multiple-origin importers to account for the remaining
imports, but check that results are qualitatively similar in the subsample of single-origin
importers. In the first stage equation the conditional multinomial logit model allows
for multiple ‘ones’ - though the discrete choice model interpretation is weakened. In the
second stage we address the multiple-origin importers issue in the following way. For
example suppose a firm imports goods from 1 country and services from 3 countries in
a given year. In that case we create 3 gs pairs and impute goods imports to the 3 pairs
based on the share of country s in total services imports. This way imports of goods
from the three pairs will add up to total goods imports. This proportional assignment
rule is consistent with our assumption of Cobb-Douglas production functions.
We specify the empirical counterpart to (29-31) as:
ygskt = 1[U˜gskt=maxqr{U˜qrkt}]
U˜gskt = aygsk,t−2 + θgs +Dg +Ds + a1tGgkt + a2t
S
skt + ekt + egskt (32)
Impgoodsgskt = exp
[
b0 + θgs +Dg +Ds + b1t
G
gkt + b2t
S
skt + ukt + ugskt
]
(33)
Impservicesgskt = exp
[
c0 + θgs +Dg +Ds + c1t
G
gkt + c2t
S
skt + vkt + vgskt
]
, (34)
gs = 1...C2.
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As described above ygskt is a binary variable that takes value one when a particular
gs combination is chosen by firm k in year t, i.e., if U˜gskt = maxqr{U˜qrkt} and zero
otherwise. Impgoodsgskt represents imports of goods by firm k at time t from country g
assigned to the gs pair, as explained above. Impservicesgskt is defined in a similar way.
These outcome variables are observed only if the gs combination is chosen (ygskt = 1).
θgs is a dummy variable that takes value one if g = s and the corresponding coefficient
in the regression is equivalent to ln Θgs in the theoretical model. Dg and Ds are vectors
of dummies for source countries of goods and services respectively while ekt, ukt and vkt
are firm-time unobservables potentially correlated with regressors.25
The trade barrier proxies, tGgkt and t
S
skt, are as defined in Section 2 and represent
the empirical counterparts of (the log of) the firm-destination-time dimension of τgkt
and τskt. Formally, we impose that ln τgkt is a linear combination of a country-specific
component tGg , a firm-time specific component t
G
kt and the trade-barrier proxy t
G
gkt. t
G
g is
a proxy for average trade costs in country g and is absorbed by the Dg country dummy.
tGkt controls for the average trade costs for the particular bundle of goods purchased by
firm k and goes into firm-time unobservables. tGgkt corresponds to the import tariff of
the firm-specific bundle in country g in year t. We impose a similar linear form for
ln τskt.
Turning to the cost of producing intermediate goods cg, our empirical specifications
allow this to be firm-origin-time-specific: cgkt. We impose that (the log of) cgkt can
be linearly decomposed into a country-specific component that will be absorbed by the
Dg country dummy, and a firm-time specific component that we capture by means our
firm-time unobservables. We impose a similar linear form for cskt. We also assume that
egskt is distributed Gumbel. We finally allow the value of imports of goods and services
to be measured with error, under the assumption that such measurement error is iid.
Therefore ugskt and vgskt contain such measurement error and are in general different
from egskt. In terms of inference, we cluster standard errors at the firm-time level in all
estimations.26
Five things are worth noting. First, the firm-time specific component ekt in (32) can
25We refrain from using country-time dummies for reasons related to computational power. Indeed,
even with a dedicated multi-core powerful server, running the first stage (32) with country-time dum-
mies implies estimating a non-linear model with more than 1000 dummy variables that are not possible
to partial out over a sample of about 300 million observations. However, we can run the two second
stages (33) and (34) with country-time dummies. The results, provided in Table 6 below, are very
similar to those obtained with country dummies.
26It would have been perhaps desirable to cluster standard errors at the country level. However,
this is technically not possible when having fixed effects in a regression. Indeed, in order to operate
clustering of standard errors in fixed effects models individuals (a firm-time pair in our setting) should
be nested within clusters while in our estimations the same firm-year could span into several clusters
(countries).
25
be arbitrarily correlated with the regressors but vanishes when estimating the first stage
conditional logit model. Indeed, components that are not choice-specific do not affect
estimations of choice-specific coefficients and/or the choice probabilities. Second, firm-
time specific components ukt and vkt in (33) and (34) can also be arbitrarily correlated
with the regressors and will be accounted for by means of fixed effects. Both types of
firm-time components will capture variation over time and unobserved heterogeneity in
input prices as well as downstream firms’ TFP not accounted for by the model.
Third, although the assumptions in Lee (1983) are in general restrictive, they are
coherent with our framework. As discussed in Bourguignon et al. (2007), Lee (1983)
imposes a certain structure on the correlation between the error terms in the selection
and outcome equations. Considering for example the import of goods outcome, the
correlations between eqrkt - egskt and ugskt should be identical for all q and r. This
result naturally follows in our framework from the fact that egskt and ugskt are iid
across alternatives and differ from each other only by some orthogonal iid measurement
error.
Fourth, because of the presence of ygsk,t−2 and the fact that we allow trade barriers
to be firm-time-origin specific, the probability of choosing a particular gs sourcing pair
by firm f at time t will vary across firms and time (sgskt = sgs in the model in Section
3). Yet, it is straightforward to show it is still true that sgskt will in general be different
from the product of marginal probabilities sgkt and sskt and will be equal to that product
only in the special case of θgs = 1, ∀g, s.27 Fifth, in the second stage of the model we
estimate equations (33) and (34) by means of a Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood
(PPML) estimator rather than log-linearizing and using OLS. This reflects our interest
in import values, rather than log-values, which is instrumental to our goal of performing
counterfactual analysis at the aggregate level.28
4.2 Estimation Results
Focusing on column (1) of Table 5, we can observe the first step of our estimation
procedure for the complete sample. The exclusion restriction, ygsk,t−2, is highly sig-
27In estimating (32) we employ the Stata command clogit and trim some observations based on
the distribution of the number of instances ygskt is equal to one across firm-years. More specifically,
we exclude from the estimation those (very few) observations pertaining to firms that in a given
year import from more than 100 goods-services origin pairs. We do this because of computational
constraints.
28The equivalence between a Poisson and a log linear model strictly holds in the case of errors
distributed log-normally and homoscedasticity. In such a case Lee (1983) is perfectly consistent with
our framework and in particular with estimating second stages in levels rather than log-linearizing.
Finally, in estimating (33) and (34) we trim the top and bottom 0.5% of observations based on the
distribution of Impgoodsgskt and Imp
services
gskt .
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nificant, meaning that past import status/fixed costs is a strong predictor of current
import status. All the other covariates have the expected sign and significance level.
More specifically, goods and services are disproportionately more likely to be sourced
from the same country (positive and significant coefficient of θgs) while trade barriers
for both goods and services matter in the choice of a particular gs pair.
In columns (2) and (3) of Table 5, we can appreciate the results of the second step
of our estimation. The most important result is that there is again evidence of strong
complementarities in importing goods and services together, as shown by the positive
and significant coefficient of θgs. In particular, firms import a higher value of goods
and services when sourcing from the same country which is at odds with a simple fixed
costs savings mechanism. At the same time, goods (services) trade barriers decrease
goods (services) import values. Moreover, service trade barriers have a negative and
significant effect on the value of goods imports. Similarly, goods trade restrictions have
a negative and significant impact on services imports values. Finally, the additional
control for selection dictated by the Lee (1983) model and coming from the first step
(we loosely label this ‘inverse Mills ratio’ - IMR - in what follows) is highly significant
in both the goods and services values regressions suggesting that it is indeed warranted
to control for selection.
In terms of magnitudes there are several things to notice. First, the easiest coefficient
to interpret and compare with previous studies is the one of tGgkt in column (2). That
coefficient measures the elasticity of goods trade values with respect to tariffs. A value
of -2.44% means that a 1% ad valorem tariff reduces trade values by 2.44%; a number
in line with the existing literature on trade elasticities (Broda and Weinstein, 2006).
As far as θgs is concerned, values from columns (2) and (3) indicate that, everything
else equal, importing goods and services from the same country corresponds to about
45-50% higher import values. This is by all means sizeable. Moving to tSskt, there is
no clear scale to consider but variation in the data. In this respect, a one standard
deviation increase in tSskt implies a 13% decrease of import values for goods and a 5%
decrease of import values for services. The corresponding numbers for tGgkt are a 5%
reduction for goods and a 6% reduction for services. All in all, this suggests there is
scope for larger trade boost effects stemming from a reduction in services as compared
to goods trade barriers.
Second, in the model described in Section 3 the parameters corresponding to θgs, t
G
gkt
and tSskt are the same across the selection and outcome equations. The use of a latent
model for estimating the selection equation means that the coefficients of our first
stage are not comparable to those of the second stage. More specifically, coefficients in
column one cannot be translated into meaningful partial effects within the conditional
27
multinomial logit model.29 Yet, coefficient ratios are comparable. In this respect,
looking across coefficients in columns (1) to (3) does suggest that, despite being simple,
our model imposes coefficient restrictions that find some counterpart in the data.
To explore the data further and provide additional support to our analysis, in panel
(b) we restrict our estimations to the sample of firms belonging to the manufacturing
sector only. The idea is to check whether results are possibly stronger for such firms
who are more likely to combine imported goods and services into a production process
along the lines of what described in equation (7). Results look qualitatively identical to
those of the complete sample both for the first step (column 4) and for the second steps
(columns 5 and 6). In terms of magnitudes, however, the coefficients corresponding
to trade barriers in the outcomes equations (first step coefficients are not really com-
parable) are considerably larger when restricting the attention to manufacturing firms
which is in line with intuition. On the other hand, the coefficients of θgs are broadly
similar between columns (2) to (3) and (5) to (6) suggesting that the strength of com-
plementarities between goods and service sourced from the same country is roughly
comparable for manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms.
In panel (c) we restrict our estimation sample to multinational and foreign owned
firms.30 On the one hand, these firms have a more prominent involvement in inter-
national activities than purely domestic firms and might be the ones benefiting the
most from a reduction in trade barriers. On the other hand, they also have extended
networks across countries allowing them to minimize the impact of differences in trade
costs across origins. Despite the sharp reduction in the number of observations, results
in columns (7) to (9) look very similar to those of the complete sample and coefficients
are all significant but in one case. Magnitudes are also roughly comparable between
the complete sample and the multinational and foreign owned sample suggesting that
multinational and foreign owned firms are no more or less likely to benefit from a trade
liberalization in goods and/or services.
Table 6 reports the results of three other robustness checks. Panel (a) simply displays
the same estimates as in panel (a) of Table 5 for the sake of comparison. Panel (b) shows
estimates from an alternative first-stage regression run on the subsample of single-origin
importers. As explained above those firms behave exactly as in our theoretical model.
Reassuringly, results are very similar to the baseline first-stage regression, which lends
support for our discrete-choice interpretation of the baseline conditional logit results.31
29See Wooldridge (2010) for a in-depth discussion of this aspect.
30This is possible using the NBB Survey on FDI.
31Note that our baseline second-stage estimation uses firm-year fixed effects, relying on multiple-
origin importers for identification. This is why we do not compare the results of second-stage regressions
on the single-origin subsample to the baseline.
28
T
ab
le
5:
M
ai
n
E
st
im
at
io
n
R
es
u
lt
s
P
an
el
(a
):
C
om
p
le
te
S
am
p
le
P
an
el
(b
):
M
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
P
an
el
(c
):
M
N
E
an
d
F
or
ei
gn
O
w
n
ed
1s
t
S
ta
ge
2n
d
S
ta
ge
2n
d
S
ta
ge
1s
t
S
ta
ge
2n
d
S
ta
ge
2n
d
S
ta
ge
1s
t
S
ta
ge
2n
d
S
ta
ge
2n
d
S
ta
ge
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
D
ep
.
V
ar
.
y g
sk
t
Im
p
G
o
o
d
s
g
sk
t
Im
p
S
er
v
ic
es
g
sk
t
y g
sk
t
Im
p
G
o
o
d
s
g
sk
t
Im
p
S
er
v
ic
es
g
sk
t
y g
sk
t
Im
p
G
o
o
d
s
g
sk
t
Im
p
S
er
v
ic
es
g
sk
t
y g
sk
,t
−2
3.
33
61
a
3.
08
06
a
3.
03
51
a
(0
.0
12
3)
(0
.0
21
0)
(0
.0
25
7)
θ g
s
0.
38
21
a
0.
51
19
a
0.
44
39
a
0.
27
21
a
0.
44
40
a
0.
40
64
a
0.
26
86
a
0.
48
75
a
0.
47
23
a
(0
.0
04
7)
(0
.0
17
2)
(0
.0
24
9)
(0
.0
05
8)
(0
.0
22
4)
(0
.0
27
6)
(0
.0
07
2)
(0
.0
24
5)
(0
.0
36
7)
tG g
k
t
-0
.0
26
4a
-0
.0
24
4a
-0
.0
29
5b
-0
.0
18
8a
-0
.0
68
2a
-0
.0
96
3a
-0
.0
17
9a
-0
.0
39
5a
-0
.0
44
1c
(0
.0
22
0)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
17
3)
(0
.0
03
2)
(0
.0
12
6)
(0
.0
23
5)
(0
.0
03
4)
(0
.0
10
3)
(0
.0
26
0)
tS s
k
t
-0
.0
27
4a
-0
.1
29
0a
-0
.0
42
1b
-0
.0
58
0a
-0
.1
90
1a
-0
.2
09
1a
-0
.0
41
8a
-0
.1
32
7a
-0
.0
15
4
(0
.0
08
6)
(0
.0
29
6)
(0
.0
19
5)
(0
.0
15
0)
(0
.0
35
4)
(0
.0
39
5)
(0
.0
17
3)
(0
.0
37
2)
(0
.0
28
6)
IM
R
0.
86
06
a
0.
97
08
a
-0
.7
12
8a
-1
.0
44
7a
-0
.9
45
7a
-1
.2
07
0a
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
32
9)
(0
.0
39
0)
(0
.0
52
8)
(0
.0
40
3)
(0
.0
62
9)
D
g
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
D
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
F
ir
m
-y
ea
r
F
E
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
C
on
d
.
L
og
it
P
P
M
L
P
P
M
L
C
on
d
.
L
og
it
P
P
M
L
P
P
M
L
C
on
d
.
L
og
it
P
P
M
L
P
P
M
L
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
25
4,
20
4,
60
0
1,
20
1,
13
1
1,
00
8,
27
4
70
,9
98
,2
00
58
9,
86
3
50
9,
52
5
36
,4
80
,6
00
61
9,
10
3
59
3,
20
9
#
of
F
ir
m
-Y
ea
rs
97
,7
62
69
,8
88
41
,2
97
27
,3
07
24
,4
01
13
,3
07
14
,0
31
13
,2
00
10
,8
58
(P
se
u
d
o)
R
2
0.
45
0.
45
0.
40
N
o
te
:
F
ir
m
-y
ea
r
cl
u
st
er
ed
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
a
p
<
0
.0
1
,
b
p
<
0
.0
5
,
c
p
<
0
.1
29
T
ab
le
6:
A
d
d
it
io
n
al
R
ob
u
st
n
es
s
C
h
ec
k
s
P
an
el
(a
):
B
as
el
in
e,
co
m
p
le
te
sa
m
p
le
P
an
el
(b
):
S
in
gl
e-
or
ig
in
im
p
or
te
rs
P
an
el
(c
):
C
ou
n
tr
y
-t
im
e
d
u
m
m
ie
s
P
an
el
(d
):
N
o
In
v
.
M
il
ls
R
at
io
1s
t
S
ta
ge
2n
d
S
ta
ge
2n
d
S
ta
ge
1s
t
S
ta
ge
2n
d
S
ta
ge
2n
d
S
ta
ge
2n
d
S
ta
ge
2n
d
S
ta
ge
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
D
ep
.
V
ar
.
y g
sk
t
Im
p
G
o
o
d
s
g
sk
t
Im
p
S
er
v
ic
es
g
sk
t
y g
sk
t
Im
p
G
o
o
d
s
g
sk
t
Im
p
S
er
v
ic
es
g
sk
t
Im
p
G
o
o
d
s
g
sk
t
Im
p
S
er
v
ic
es
g
sk
t
y g
sk
,t
−2
3.
33
61
a
3.
54
85
a
(0
.0
12
3)
(0
.0
31
2)
θ g
s
0.
38
21
a
0.
51
19
a
0.
44
39
a
2.
17
66
a
0.
50
88
a
0.
43
99
a
0.
66
26
a
0.
63
85
a
(0
.0
04
7)
(0
.0
17
2)
(0
.0
24
9)
(0
.0
38
3)
(0
.0
17
0)
(0
.0
24
7)
(0
.0
17
0)
(0
.0
24
6)
tG g
k
t
-0
.0
26
4a
-0
.0
24
4a
-0
.0
29
5a
-0
.0
63
0a
-0
.0
27
3a
-0
.0
32
9a
-0
.0
32
7a
-0
.0
43
8b
(0
.0
22
0)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
17
3)
(0
.0
04
7)
(0
.0
06
1)
(0
.0
16
3)
(0
.0
06
0)
(0
.0
18
5)
tS s
k
t
-0
.0
27
4a
-0
.1
29
0a
-0
.0
42
1a
-0
.0
69
5a
-0
.1
38
0a
-0
.0
61
2a
-0
.1
50
0a
-0
.0
57
6b
(0
.0
08
6)
(0
.0
29
6)
(0
.0
19
5)
(0
.0
16
3)
(0
.0
29
6)
(0
.0
19
7)
(0
.0
29
0)
(0
.0
19
4)
IM
R
0.
86
06
a
0.
97
08
a
0.
87
07
a
0.
97
70
a
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
32
9)
(0
.0
22
2)
(0
.0
30
9)
D
g
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
D
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
F
ir
m
-y
ea
r
F
E
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
C
ou
n
tr
y
-y
ea
r
d
u
m
m
ie
s
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
ye
s
ye
s
n
o
n
o
C
on
d
.
L
og
it
P
P
M
L
P
P
M
L
C
on
d
.
L
og
it
P
P
M
L
P
P
M
L
P
P
M
L
P
P
M
L
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
25
4,
20
4,
60
0
1,
20
1,
13
1
1,
00
8,
27
4
60
,2
86
,2
00
1,
20
1,
13
1
1,
00
8,
27
4
1,
20
1,
13
1
1,
00
8,
27
4
#
of
F
ir
m
-Y
ea
rs
97
,7
62
69
,8
88
41
,2
97
23
,1
87
69
,8
88
41
,2
97
69
,8
88
41
,2
97
(P
se
u
d
o)
R
2
0.
45
0.
53
69
N
o
te
:
F
ir
m
-y
ea
r
cl
u
st
er
ed
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
a
p
<
0
.0
1
,
b
p
<
0
.0
5
,
c
p
<
0
.1
30
In Panel (c) we run another alternative set of second-stage regressions where we control
for country-year unobservables (as explained above, using country-year dummies in the
first stage would be computationally unfeasible). A simple gravity regression framework
would indeed suggest a number of omitted time-varying country characteristics making
this robustness check worthwhile. In these regressions use the inverse Mills ratio from
the baseline regression to control for selection effects. Results are qualitatively similar
to the baseline, with slightly higher trade cost elasticities. Finally in panel (d) we check
whether controlling for selection is crucial for our results. In particular, we exclude
from the estimation of the two outcome equations the inverse Mills ratio computed in
the (baseline) first stage. Results remain qualitatively unchanged. However, coefficient
values are somewhat inflated. Overall, this suggests that controlling for selection is
warranted but does not affect our core findings much.
5 Counterfactual Experiments
Our empirical framework can be used to quantify the impact of changes in trade barriers
on both trade in goods and trade in services. We focus on data referring to the most
recent year – 2005 – and hypothesize the EU and the US sign a trade agreement. We
explore the effects of three different scenarios: i) the trade agreement involves the com-
plete eliminations of trade in goods barriers only (Scenario G); ii) the trade agreement
eliminates trade in services barriers only (scenario S); iii) the trade agreement elimi-
nates barriers to both goods and services (Scenario GS). In practice, the assumption
we are making is that the US and the EU sign an agreement eliminating the current
tariffs for goods while putting in place provisions for trade in services similar to those
applying to the services trade agreements we have in the data and that we have used
to quantify our parameters.
Our thought experiment thus provides insights into the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP) in the case it eventually leads to a substantial liberal-
ization of goods and/or services trade.32 At the same time, the trade boosting effects
from further integration we find might well be, under the current international political
scenario, best considered as foregone trade from the lack of further integration. Our
exercise involves the comparison of imports of Belgian firms predicted by our model
under the current trade barriers situation versus the situation in which trade barriers
between Belgium and the US are set to zero (tGgkt = 0 when g = US and/or t
S
skt = 0
32We fully acknowledge that TTIP would involve much more than just goods and services trade.
For example, also issues related to investments or IPR could be affected by the agreement. Therefore,
out experiment should be seen as only quantifying the consequences for trade in goods and trade in
services all else equal.
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when s = US). This is accomplished in three steps: first we need to compute for all
firms the counterfactual probabilities of importing goods and services from any gs pair
under the different scenarios, as described in equation (32); second, we need to compute
counterfactual firm imports from any gs pair using equations (33) and (34).
Finally, we need to consider the product of importing probabilities and imported
values at the firm level and aggregate this up to obtain total trade values. This pro-
cess is computationally intensive due to the dimensionality of the data but otherwise
straightforward. More involved calculations are instead required to compute counter-
factual changes in the price index (23).33 Counterfactual price index values are needed
to correctly scale firm imports from any gs pair coming from (33) and (34) but do not
affect first stage probabilities. We actually find such counterfactual price index changes
to be rather small (-0.12% for (G), -0.06% for (S) and -0.12% for (GS)) and so in what
follows we discard them.
Comparing the predicted probabilities of importing and those predicted under the
three different scenarios for the US, we observe that the share of importers of services
increases by 0.3% in case of trade in goods liberalization (G), by 4.2% in the case of
services liberalization (S) and by 4.5% in case of both goods and services liberalization
(GS). The increases in the share of firms importing goods from the US are respectively
6.0% (G), 0.1% (S) and 6.1% (GS). Therefore, both trade liberalizations have positive
effects on both the share of Belgian goods and services importers from the US. Though
the impact of, for example, service trade liberalization on the share of firms importing
goods from the US looks quite negligible. Yet, when combining changes in importing
probabilities with changes in imported values and aggregating up these effects are not
trivial anymore. This is due to the fact that import values of goods (services) are
substantially affected by changes in service (goods) trade barriers.
Our model does a good job in matching aggregate imports by country. More specif-
ically, our model can replicate 95% of the cross-country variation in goods imports and
87% of the cross-country variation in trade in services. Focusing on aggregate goods
imports, we can compare how they would evolve in the three different scenarios. In the
case of trade in goods liberalization (G) goods imports from the US would increase by
16.5%, by about 5% in case of a services liberalization (S) and by 22% in case of both
(GS). Considering that in 2015 the US exported goods to Belgium for a value of about
33Rather than solving the integral involved in (23) we use estimates from the first stage and draw
a 254,204,600 iid random sample from the Gumbel distribution. Using both the parameters and the
254,204,600 ln ξgskt values we then compute the numerical equivalent of (23) while setting σ = 5 as
suggested in Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003). We repeat the process 200 times and assign to P the
average value across the 200 replications. This corresponds to the initial value of the price index. In
order to compute counterfactual changes of the price index we apply the same procedure while using
counterfactual parameter values.
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34 billion dollars, a 22% increase stemming from a joint goods and services liberaliza-
tion translates into 7.5 billion dollars more trade. Using similar figures for the entire
EU the 22% figure would imply a 60 billion dollars increase in trade in goods between
the US and the EU. Using a similar reasoning a services-only (goods-only) trade liberal-
ization only would bring about 14 (45) billion dollars more trade in goods between the
US and the EU. Therefore, the increase in goods imports would be important for both
liberalizations, but the highest gains can be achieved only through both liberalizations
together. Moreover, the effect of the joint liberalization is somewhat stronger than the
separate effect of the two (i.e. the gains from (G) + (S) are lower than (GS)).
Looking at the services imports side, the increases would respectively be of 2% (G),
8% (S) and about 11% (GS). Considering that in 2014 the US exported services to the
EU for a value of about 220 billion dollars, an 11% increase translates into 24 billion
dollars more trade. As for goods, both liberalizations affect trade in services, but the
joint effect of (GS) is a bit stronger than the sum of the two (G+S). Our numbers are
qualitatively similar to those computed for other European countries and with different
methodologies. For example, Felbermayr and Larch (2013) study the potential impact
of TTIP on some EU countries’ imports and exports. Their study predicts an increase
in US exports to Germany in the order of 17% for goods and 1.4% for services. These
numbers are smaller than ours and (in the light of our model) rightly so because they
do not take into account the cross-effect that we highlight in this paper.
In our analysis we model complementarities between imports of goods and services
at the firm level via two channels: (i) a technological parameter θgs taking a positive
value when goods and services are imported from the same country; (ii) the joint use of
goods and services into firms’ production functions implying that service (goods) trade
barriers impact the sourcing choice and value of goods (services) imports. In order to
gauge which effect dominates quantitatively in our analysis we perform the following
exercise. We suppose θgs to be neutral by setting it equal to zero for all g and s.
We recompute import probabilities, import values and aggregate imports by country.
We then perform our 3 counterfactual trade liberalization scenarios under the θgs = 0
constraint. In doing so we find the increase in trade in goods with the US to be: 16.8%
(G), 1.7% (S) and18.7% (GS). With respect to services imports, we predict increases
of: 0.8% (G), 7.5% (S) and 8.5% (GS). These numbers are overall smaller than with an
unconstrained θ, but suggest that channel (ii) is relatively more important.
Last but not least our model does feature third country effects. In particular Belgian
firms importing probabilities and import values, as well as Belgium aggregate imports,
from all country pertaining to our analysis are affected by a change in trade barriers with
the US. However, these changes (available upon request) are quantitatively small. The
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key message from these estimates is that countries sufficiently far away from Belgium
can actually see their exports to Belgium increase because of a reduction in trade
barriers between Belgium and the US.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have examined the interactions between goods and services imports
within firms and explored their implications for goods and services trade policies. We
started from several observations pointing towards some complementarity between im-
ports of both types of products: firstly, importers of both goods and services account for
the lion share of Belgian imports. Secondly, sourcing both goods and services from the
same country is disproportionately likely, given the marginal frequencies of importing
goods or importing services from that country. Thirdly, services imports appear to be
negatively correlated with goods trade costs and vice versa, even when controlling for
firm-year and country unobservables.
We then develop a theoretical model to guide our empirical analysis that embeds
a discrete choice of input origin countries in a simple general equilibrium setup. The
model ties the choice of origin countries and the conditional choice of import values to
a relatively narrow set of parameters. In particular, we capture technological comple-
mentarities in goods and services from the same origin country. Moreover, input-output
linkages in our model create a trade policy spillover, not just from intermediate to final
products, but also from intermediate goods to intermediate services.
In moving to the empirics, we extend beyond the model to better capture the richness
of the data and consider complementary channels. In particular, we use the selection
model developed in Lee (1983) and described by Bourguignon et al. (2007). The first-
stage selection equation features a conditional multinomial logit for the probability
to source inputs from a given country. In the second stage, we estimate two export
value outcome regressions, one for goods and one for services, that are augmented with
selection-bias controls coming from the first stage. We also allow for both firm-specific
time-varying and country-specific time invariant unobservables that may be arbitrarily
correlated with the regressors in both the first and second stage.
Our estimation allows us to compute counterfactual responses to changes in goods
and services trade costs, and measures of these spillovers. These results are important
not just because bi-traders account for a large share of trade, but also because they can
affect the design of trade policy evaluation and of trade policy itself.
By focusing on firms rather than sectors, this paper offers a first attempt at looking
at goods-services trade policy spillovers while accounting for the ongoing “servitization”
34
of manufacturing. Several simplifying assumptions were necessary to achieve tractabil-
ity and we look forward to further work extending this approach.
References
Amiti, M., Itskhoki, O., and Konings, J. (2014). Importers, Exporters, and Exchange
Rate Disconnect. American Economic Review, 104(7):1942–78.
Anderson, J. E., Milot, C. A., and Yotov, Y. V. (2014). How Much Does Geography
Deflect Services Trade? Canadian Answers. International Economic Review, 55:791–
818.
Anderson, J. E. and Van Wincoop, E. (2003). Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to
the Border Puzzle. American Economic Review, 93(1):170–192.
Anderson, S. P., De Palma, A., and Thisse, J. F. (1992). Discrete choice theory of
product differentiation. MIT press.
Antras, P., Fort, T., and Tintelnot, F. (2017). The Margins of Global Sourcing: Theory
and Evidence from U.S. Firms. American Economic Review, forthcoming.
Ariu, A. (2016a). Crisis-Proof Services: Why Trade in Services Did Not Suffer During
the 2008-2009 Collapse. Journal of International Economics, 98(1):138–149.
Ariu, A. (2016b). Services Versus Goods Trade: A Firm Level Comparison. Review of
World Economics, 152(1):19–41.
Ariu, A., Mayneris, F., and Parenti, M. (2016). One Way To The Top: How Services
Boost the Demand for Goods. University of Geneva Mimeo.
Ariu, A. and Mion, G. (2016). Trade in Services and Occupational Tasks: An Empirical
Investigation. World Economy, forthcoming.
Armenter, R. and Koren, M. (2013). Everything All the Time? Entry and Exit in US
Import Varieties. Central European University Mimeo.
Bernard, A. B., Van Beveren, I., and Vandenbussche, H. (2010). Multi-Product Ex-
porters, Carry-Along Trade and the Margins of Trade. Research Series 2010-203,
National Bank of Belgium.
Bourguignon, F., Fournier, M., and Gurgand, M. (2007). Selection Bias Corrections
Based On The Multinomial Logit Model: Monte Carlo Comparisons. Journal of
Economic Surveys, 21(1):174–205.
35
Breinlich, H. and Criscuolo, C. (2011). International Trade in Services: a Portrait of
Importers and Exporters. Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, 84(2):188–
206.
Breinlich, H., Soderbery, A., and Wright, G. C. (2016). From Selling Goods to Selling
Services: Firm Responses to Trade Liberalization. GEP Discussion Paper 2016-07.
Broda, C. and Weinstein, D. E. (2006). Globalization and the Gains From Variety. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(2):541–585.
Chaney, T. (2008). Distorted Gravity: The Intensive and Extensive Margins of Inter-
national Trade. The American Economic Review, 98(4):1707–1721.
Crozet, M. and Milet, E. (2017a). Should Everybody be in Services? The Effect
of Servitization on Manufacturing Firm Performance,. Journal of Economics and
Management Strategy, forthcoming.
Crozet, M. and Milet, E. (2017b). The Servitization of French Manufacturing Firms.
In Fontagn, L. and Harisson, A., editors, The Factory-Free Economy: Outsourcing,
Servitzation, and the Future of Industry. Oxford University Press.
Crozet, M., Milet, E., and Mirza, D. (2016). The Impact of Domestic Regulations
on International Trade in Services: Evidence from Firm-Level Data. Journal of
Comparative Economics, 44(3):585–607.
Eaton, J., Kortum, S., and Kramarz, F. (2011). An Anatomy of International Trade:
Evidence From French Firms. Econometrica, 79(5):1453–1498.
Egger, P., Larch, M., and Staub, K. (2012). Trade Preferences and Bilateral Trade in
Goods and Services: A Structural Approach. CEPR Discussion Paper 9051.
Felbermayr, G. J. and Larch, M. (2013). The Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP): Potentials, Problems and Perspectives. CESifo Forum, 14(2):49–
60.
Francois, J. and Hoekman, B. (2010). Services Trade and Policy. Journal of Economic
Literature, 48(3):642–692.
Francois, J., van Meijl, H., and van Tongeren, F. (2003). Trade Liberalization and
Developing Countries Under the Doha Round. CEPR Discussion Papers 4032.
Kasahara, H. and Lapham, B. (2013). Productivity and the Decision to Import and
Export: Theory and Evidence. Journal of International Economics, 89(2):297–316.
36
Kelle, M. and Kleinert, J. (2010). German Firms in Service Trade. Applied Economics
Quarterly (formerly: Konjunkturpolitik), Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 56(1):51–72.
Lee, L.-F. (1983). Generalized Econometric Models with Selectivity. Econometrica,
51(2):507–12.
Mayer, T., Melitz, M. J., and Ottaviano, G. I. P. (2014). Market Size, Competition,
and the Product Mix of Exporters. American Economic Review, 104(2):495–536.
Mayer, T. and Ottaviano, G. I. P. (2007). The Happy Few: the Internationalisation of
European Firms, volume 3. Brussels: Bruegel Blueprint Series.
Mion, G. and Zhu, L. (2013). Import Competition from and Offshoring to China: A
Curse or Blessing for Firms? Journal of International Economics, 89(1):202–215.
Muuˆls, M. and Pisu, M. (2009). Imports and Exports at the Level of the Firm: Evidence
from Belgium. The World Economy, 32(5):692–734.
Neely, A. (2008). Exploring the Financial Consequences of the Servitization of Manu-
facturing. Operations Management Research, 1(2):103–118.
Neely, A., Benedettini, O., and Visnjic, I. (2011). The servitization of Manufacturing:
Further Evidence. In 18th European operations management association conference,
Cambridge, pages 3–6.
Nord˚as, H. K. (2010). Trade in Goods and Services: Two Sides of the Same Coin?
Economic Modelling, 27(2):496–506.
Roy, R., Shehab, E., Tiwari, A., Baines, T., Lightfoot, H., Benedettini, O., and Kay, J.
(2009). The Servitization of Manufacturing: A Review of Literature and Reflection
on Future Challenges. Journal of Manufacturing Technology Management, 20(5):547–
567.
Timmer, M. P., Los, B., Stehrer, R., and Vries, G. J. (2013). Fragmentation, Incomes
and Jobs: An Analysis of European Competitiveness. Economic Policy, 28(76):613–
661.
Walter, P. and Dell’mour, R. (2010). Firm-Level Analysis of International Trade in
Services. IFC Working Papers No.4.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2010). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. MIT
press.
37
Appendices
Table A-1: Correspondence Between BoP and PMR Sectors
BoP Classification BoP Code PMR Sector
Air transport 210 Airlines
Air transport, passengers 211 Airlines
Air transport, freights 212 Airlines
Air transport, other 213 Airlines
Other transport 214 Rail
Other transport, passengers 215 Rail
Other transport, freights 216 Rail
Other transport, other 217 Rail
Other transport 214 Road
Other transport, passengers 215 Road
Other transport, freights 216 Road
Other transport, other 217 Road
Communication services 245 Post
Communication services 245 Telecom
Postal and courrier services 246 Post
Telecommunications services 247 Telecom
Legal, Accounting, Management, Consulting and Public Relations 274 Accounting
Legal, Accounting, Management, Consulting and Public Relations 274 Legal
Architectural, Engineering and Other Technical Services 280 Architect
Architectural, Engineering and Other Technical Services 280 Engineer
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Table A-2: List of countries included in our analysis
iso 2 country iso 2 country
AE United Arab Emirates IN India
AO Angola IT Italy
AR Argentina JP Japan
AT Austria KR Korea, Republic of
AU Australia LR Liberia
BG Bulgaria LU Luxembourg
BR Brazil MA Morocco
CA Canada MX Mexico
CD Congo, The Democratic Republic of the MY Malaysia
CH Switzerland NL Netherlands
CN China NO Norway
CZ Czech Republic NZ New Zealand
DE Germany PL Poland
DK Denmark PT Portugal
DZ Algeria RO Romania
ES Spain RU Russian Federation
FI Finland SE Sweden
FR France SG Singapore
GB United Kingdom SK Slovakia
GR Greece TH Thailand
HK Hong Kong TN Tunisia
HU Hungary TR Turkey
ID Indonesia TW Taiwan
IE Ireland US United States
IL Israel ZA South Africa
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Table A-3: Reduced-form estimates of the impact of services trade barriers on goods
sourcing choices, and vice versa. Robustness: eliminating firm-time observations corre-
sponding to Vehicles and Transportation
Goods Services
(1) (2)
Dep. Var.: IGgkt = 1 I
S
skt = 1
Goods trade barriers -0.0478a -0.0188a
(0.0027) (0.0030)
Services trade barriers -0.0050 -0.0649a
(0.0044) (0.0072)
Firm-Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 5,141,700 2,944,600
Pseudo R-squared 0.4001 0.4030
Number of firm-years 102,834 58,892
Note: Firm-time clustered standard errors in parentheses. a p<0.01,
b p<0.05, c p<0.1
40
CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Recent Discussion Papers 
1509 Johannes Boehm 
Swati Dhingra 
John Morrow 
Product Diversification in Indian 
Manufacturing 
1508 Hanwei Huang 
Jiandong Ju 
Vivian Z. Yue 
Structural Adjustments and International 
Trade: Theory and Evidence from China 
1507 Laura Alfaro 
Pol Antràs 
Davin Chor 
Paolo Conconi 
Internalizing Global Value Chains: 
A Firm-Level Analysis 
1506 Alessandro Iaria 
Carlo Schwarz 
Fabian Waldinger 
Frontier Knowledge and Scientific 
Production: Evidence from the Collapse of 
International Science 
1505 Fabrice Defever 
Alejandro Riaño 
Twin Peaks 
1504 Gene M. Grossman 
Elhanan Helpman 
Ezra Oberfield 
Thomas Sampson 
The Productivity Slowdown and the 
Declining Labor Share: A Neoclassical 
Exploration 
1503 Camille Landais 
Arash Nekoei 
Peter Nilsson 
David Seim 
Johannes Spinnewijn 
Risk-Based Selection in Unemployment 
Insurance: Evidence and Implications 
1502 Swati Dhingra 
John Morrow 
Efficiency in Large Markets with Firm 
Heterogeneity 
1501 Richard Murphy 
Judith Scott-Clayton 
Gill Wyness 
The End of Free College in England: 
Implications for Quality, Enrolments and 
Equity 
1500 Nicholas Bloom 
Renata Lemos 
Raffaella Sadun 
John Van Reenen 
 
Healthy Business? Managerial Education and 
Management in Healthcare 
1499 Thomas Sampson Brexit: The Economics of International 
Disintegration 
1498 Saul Estrin 
Daniel Gozman 
Susanna Khavul 
 
Equity Crowdfunding and Early Stage 
Entrepreneurial Finance: Damaging or 
Disruptive? 
1497 Francesco Caselli 
Alan Manning 
Robot Arithmetic: Can New Technology 
Harm All Workers or the Average Worker? 
1496 Nicholas Bloom 
Charles I Jones 
John Van Reenen 
Michael Webb 
 
Are Ideas Getting Harder to Find? 
 
1495 Christian Krekel Can Rising Instructional Time Crowd out 
Student Pro-Social Behaviour? Unintended 
Consequences of a German High School 
Reform 
1494 Lorenzo Caliendo 
Luca David Opromolla 
Fernando Parro 
Alessandro Sforza 
 
Goods and Factor Market Integration: A 
Quantitative Assessment of the EU 
Enlargement 
1493 Andrew E. Clark 
Sarah Flèche 
Warn N. Lekfuangfu 
The Long-Lasting Effects of Family and 
Childhood on Adult Wellbeing: Evidence 
from British Cohort Data 
1492 Daniel Paravisini 
Veronica Rappoport 
Philipp Schnabl 
 
Specialization in Bank Lending: Evidence 
from Exporting Firms 
The Centre for Economic Performance Publications Unit 
Tel: +44 (0)20 7955 7673 Email info@cep.lse.ac.uk 
Website: http://cep.lse.ac.uk Twitter: @CEP_LSE 
